We present a fully symmetric constant round authenticated group key agreement protocol in dynamic scenario. Our proposed scheme achieves forward secrecy and is provably secure under DDH assumption in the security model of Bresson et al. providing, we feel, better security guarantee than previously published results. The protocol is efficient in terms of both communication and computation power.
Introduction
A group key agreement protocol allows a group of users communicating over an untrusted, open network to come up with a common secret value called a session key. This session key can be used to facilitate desirable security services, such as confidentiality and data integrity.
Authenticated group key agreement allows two or more parties to agree upon a common secret key even in the presence of active adversaries. These protocols are designed to deal with the problem to ensure users in the group that no other principals aside from members of the group can learn any information about the session key. The design of secure and efficient authenticated group key agreement protocols gets much attention in current research with increasing applicability in numerous group-oriented and collaborative applications [13, 17, 5, 18, 11, 19, 25, 31] .
Constructing forward secure authenticated key agreement scheme in a formal security model has recently received much importance. Efficiency is another critical concern in designing such protocols for practical applications. In particular, number of rounds may be crucial in an environment where quite a large number of users are involved and the group-membership is dynamic. In a dynamic group key agreement, the users can join or leave the group at any time. Such schemes must ensure that the session key is updated upon every membership change, so that the subsequent sessions are protected from leaving members and the previous sessions are protected from joining members. The cost of updates associated with group membership changes should be minimum. There are quite a number of dynamic group key agreement protocols [14, 15, 16, 28, 26, 27, 31] . In this paper, we study the problem of dynamic authenticated group key agreement. We design our algorithm for join and leave to ensure minimum modification to the computation already precomputed when a pool of users join or leave the group and the session key is updated. Our Contribution : The main contribution of this paper is to obtain a provably secure constant round authenticated group key agreement protocol in dynamic scenario where a user can join or leave the group at his desire with updated key. We propose in Section 3 a scheme that is proven to be secure against passive adversary assuming the intractability of decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Then we authenticate this unauthenticated protocol by incorporating digital signature and provide a concrete security analysis against active adversaries in the model as formalized by Bresson et al. [15] . We appropriately modify the Katz-Yung [25] technique to achieve authentication in our protocol. Finally, we extend this static authenticated protocol to dynamic authenticated protocol by introducing algorithms for join and leave. We prove (Section 4) that the security of both the static and dynamic authenticated protocols rely on that of the unauthenticated protocol. The security model of Bresson et al. [15] is adopted for the security analysis of the dynamic case. Our protocol achieves forward secrecy, is fully symmetric and being of constant round, is more efficient as compared to the protocol of Bresson et al. [15] (whose round complexity is linear in the number of group members). Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model.
More recently, Kim et al. [28] proposed a very efficient constant round dynamic authenticated group key agreement protocol and provide a security analysis of their static authenticated protocol which is shown to be secure under computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption using random hash oracle. They did not consider the security analysis of their dynamic authenticated protocol. Unlike [28] , we have achieved the security of our dynamic scheme in the standard model under standard DDH assumption without using any random oracle. We separately analyze the security of our static unauthenticated protocol, static authenticated protocol and dynamic authenticated protocol and reduce the security of the static authenticated protocol and dynamic authenticated protocol to that of the unauthenticated protocol.
Our proposed scheme considers the users U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n participating in the protocol on a ring where U i−1 , U i+1 are respectively the left and right neighbors of U i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with U 0 = U n , U n+1 = U 1 . Only 2 rounds are required in our protocol which makes our protocol efficient from communication point of view. User U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends a message in first round only to its neighbors U i−1 , U i+1 and a message in second round to the rest of the n − 1 users. Each user sends one message in each round with bit length at most 2|q| + 2|s| where |q| is the length of q, the order of the underlying group on which DDH problem is assumed to be hard and |s| is the length of signature. Each group member computes at most 3 modular exponentiations (1 in round 1 and 2 in round 2), 2n − 2 modular multiplications (n − 1 multiplications for recovery of all right keys and n − 1 multiplications for session key computation), 1 division, 2 signature generation and n + 1 signature verification.
Our protocol is more efficient as compared to the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt [18] (BD) in terms of both communication and computation power. Moreover, we emphasize that our protocol is dynamic. The authentication in BD protocol was introduced by Katz and Yung [25] (KY) that requires 3 rounds. Table 1 analyzes the efficiency of our static authenticated protocol and authenticated protocol KY [25] where both the schemes are forward secure, achieve provable security under DDH assumption in standard model. We use the following notations: In each round of authenticated BD protocol, a user sends message to the rest of the users (although the communication in the second round can be reduced). In contrast, each user in our protocol sends a message only to its two neighbors in the first round and a message to the rest of the users in the second round. Our protocol differs from the BD protocol in the way the session key is computed after the rounds are over. Each user computes n 2 2 + 3n 2 − 3 modular multiplications in BD protocol. On a more positive note, each user in our protocol requires to compute at most 2n modular multiplications. This makes our protocol much more efficient as compared to BD protocol. Besides, our protocol has the ability to detect the presence of a corrupted group member, although we cannot detect who among the group members are behaving improperly. If an invalid message is sent by a corrupted member, then this can be detected by all legitimate members of the group and the protocol execution may be stopped instantly. This feature makes our protocol interesting when the adversarial model no longer assumes that the group members are honest.
Preliminaries
In this section, we define the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem and describe the security model in which we prove the security of our group key agreement protocol. We use the notation a ←− S to denote that a is generated randomly from S.
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
Let G = g be a multiplicative group of some large prime order q. Then Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem on G is defined as follows:
Instance : (g a , g b , g c ) for some a, b, c ∈ Z * q . Output : yes if c = ab mod q and output no otherwise. We consider two distributions as:
The advantage of any probabilistic, polynomial-time, 0/1-valued distinguisher D in solving DDH problem on G is defined to be : Adv
Security Model
We describe below the adversarial model following Bresson et al.'s [15] formal security model that we adopt for the security analysis of our protocols. This model is more general in the sense that it covers authenticated key agreement in group setting and suited for dynamic groups. Let P = {U 1 , . . . , U n } be a set of n (fixed) users or participants. At any point of time, any subset of P may decide to establish a session key. Thus a user can execute the protocol for group key agreement several times withdifferent partners, can join or leave the group at his desire by executing the protocols for Join or Leave. We identify the execution of protocols for key agreement, member(s) join and member(s) leave as different sessions. The adversarial model consists of allowing each user an unlimited number of instances with which it executes the protocol for key agreement or inclusion or exclusion of a user or a set of users. We assume adversary never participates as a user in the protocol. This adversarial model allows concurrent execution of the protocol. The interaction between the adversary A and the protocol participants occur only via oracle queries, which model the adversary's capabilities in a real attack. Let S, S 1 , S 2 be three sets defined as:
where {V 1 , . . . , V l } is any non-empty subset of P. We will require the following notations. Π i U : i-th instance of user U . sk i U : session key after execution of the protocol by Π i U . sid i U : session identity for instance Π i U . We set sid
wish to agree upon a common key. pid i U : partner identity for instance Π i U , defined by pid
U : 0/1-valued variable which is set to be 1 by Π i U upon normal termination of the session and 0 otherwise.
We will make the assumption that in each session at most one instance of each user participates. Further, an instance of a particular user participates in exactly one session. This is not a very restrictive assumption, since a user can spawn an instance for each session it participates in. On the other hand, there is an important consequence of this assumption. Suppose there are several sessions which are being concurrently executed. Let the session ID's be sid 1 , . . . , sid k . Then for any instance Π i U , there is exactly one j such that (U, i) ∈ sid j and for any j 1 = j 2 , we have sid j 1 ∩ sid j 2 = ∅. Thus at any particular point of time, if we consider the collection of all instances of all users, then the relation of being in the same session is an equivalence relation whose equivalence classes are the session IDs.
We assume that the adversary has complete control over all communications in the network. All information that the adversary gets to see is written in a transcript. So a transcript consists of all the public information flowing across the network. The following oracles model an adversary's interaction with the users in the network: -Send(U, i, m) : This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may intercept a message and then either modify it, create a new one or simply forward it to the intended participant. The output of the query is the reply (if any) generated by the instance Π i U upon receipt of message m. The adversary is allowed to prompt the unused instance Π i U to initiate the protocol with partners U 2 , . . . , U l , l ≤ n, by invoking Send(U, i, U 2 , . . . , U l ).
-Execute(S) : This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest execution of group key agreement protocol among unused instances Π
and outputs the transcript of the execution. A transcript consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.
-Join(S, S 1 ) : This query models the insertion of user instances Π
in the group {V 1 , . . . , V l } ⊂ P for which Execute have already been queried. The output of this query is the transcript generated by the invocation of algorithm Join. If Execute(S) has not taken place, then the adversary is given no output.
-Leave(S, S 2 ) : This query models the removal of user instances Π
If Execute(S) has not taken place, then the adversary is given no output. Otherwise, algorithm Leave is invoked. The adversary is given the transcript generated by the honest execution of procedure Leave.
-Reveal(U, i) : This outputs session key sk i U . This query models the misuse of the session keys, i.e known session key attack.
-Corrupt(U ) : This outputs the long-term secret key (if any) of player U . The adversarial model that we adopt is a weak-corruption model in the sense that only the long-term secret keys are compromised, but the ephemeral keys or the internal data of the protocol participants are not corrupted. This query models (perfect) forward secrecy.
This query is allowed only once, at any time during the adversary's execution. A bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. The adversary is given sk i U if b = 1, and a random session key if b = 0. This oracle computes the adversary's ability to distinguish a real session key from a random one.
An adversary which has access to the Execute, Join, Leave, Reveal, Corrupt and Test oracles, is considered to be passive while an active adversary is given access to the Send oracle in addition. (For static case, there is no Join or Leave queries as a group of fixed size is considered.)
The adversary can ask Send, Execute, Join, Leave, Reveal and Corrupt queries several times, but Test query is asked only once and on a fresh instance. We say that an instance Π i U is fresh unless either the adversary, at some point, queried Reveal(U, i) or Reveal(U , j) with U ∈ pid Let Succ denote the event that the adversary A wins the game for a protocol XP. We define
to be the advantage of the adversary A in attacking the protocol XP. The protocol XP is said to be a secure unauthenticated group key agreement (KA) protocol if there is no polynomial time passive adversary with non-negligible advantage. In other words, for every probabilistic, polynomial-time, 0/1 valued algorithm A, Adv A,XP < 1 M L for every fixed L > 0 and sufficiently large integer M . We say that protocol XP is a secure authenticated group key agreement (AKA) protocol if there is no polynomial time active adversary with non-negligible advantage. Next we define Adv KA XP (t, q E ) := the maximum advantage of any passive adversary attacking protocol XP, running in time t and making q E calls to the Execute oracle. Adv AKA XP (t, q E , q S ) := the maximum advantage of any active adversary attacking protocol XP, running in time t and making q E calls to the Execute oracle and q S calls to the Send oracle. Adv AKA XP (t, q E , q J , q L , q S ) := the maximum advantage of any active adversary attacking protocol XP, running in time t and making q E calls to the Execute oracle, q J calls to Join oracle, q L calls to the Leave oracle and q S calls to the Send oracle.
Protocol
Suppose a set of n users P = {U 1 , . . . , U n } wish to establish a common session key among themselves. Quite often, we identify a user U i with it's instance Π
(for some integer d i that is session specific) during a protocol execution. We consider the users U 1 , . . . , U n participating in the protocol are on a ring and U i−1 , U i+1 are respectively the left and right neighbors of U i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, U 0 = U n , U n+1 = U 1 and U n+i is taken to be U i . As mentioned earlier, we consider a multiplicative group G of some large prime order q with g as a generator. We also consider a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * q .
Unauthenticated Key Agreement Protocol
Figure 1: The unauthenticated group key agreement among n = 5 users.
First we informally describe our unauthenticated protocol KeyAgree that involves two rounds and a key computation phase. At the start of the session, each user
chooses randomly a private key x i ∈ Z * q . In the first round, U i computes X i = g x i and sends X i to its neighbors
and sends Y i to the rest of the users in the second round. Finally in the key computation phase,
as follows making use of his own right key
). If verification fails, then U i aborts. Otherwise, U i has the correct right keys of all the users. U i computes the session key sk
which is equal to g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+xnx 1 . U i also computes and stores x = H(sk
) for a join operation and stores his left key and right key K L i , K R i respectively for a leave operation as we will see in the subsequent subsections. We refer x as the seed which is common to all users involved in the session. Figure 1 illustrates the protocol with n = 5 users.
Observe that each user computes 3 exponentiations (1 in round 1 and 2 in round 2) and at most 2n − 2 multiplications (n − 1 multiplications for recovery of all right keys and n − 1 multiplications for session key computation). The formal description of the protocol is given below.
(Round 1):
) computes X i = g x i and sends X i to U i−1 and U i+1 ; 3. end for 4. Note that X 0 = X n and X n+1 = X 1 .
(Round 2):
U i sends Y i to the rest of the users; 8. end for
= NULL and aborts the protocol; 17. else U i computes the session key sk 
Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
We authenticate the unauthenticated protocol of Section 3.1 by incorporating a standard digital signature scheme DSig = (K, S, V) where K is the key generation algorithm, S is the signature generation algorithm and V is the signature verification algorithm. As part of this signature scheme, K generates a signing and a verification key sk i (or sk U i ) and pk i (or pk U i ) respectively for each user U i . Session identity is an important issue of our authentication mechanism which uniquely identifies the session and is same for all instances participating in the session.
Suppose instances Π
wish to agree upon a common key in a session. Then according to our definition, sid
Note that the instance numbers can be easily generated using counter. We make the assumption that in each session at most one instance of each user participates and an instance of a particular user participates in exactly one session. As mentioned earlier, this is a reasonable assumption to avoid collisions in the session identities.
At the start of the session, Π
need not to know the entire set sid
. This set is built up as the protocol proceeds. We use a variable partial session-identity psid d U for instance Π d U involved in a session to keep the partial information about it's session identity. Initially, psid
and finally after completion of the session, psid
i.e. the set of users with which it is partnered in the particular session. We describe below the algorithm AuthKeyAgree that is obtained by modifying algorithm KeyAgree by introducing signatures in the communication.
) sets its partial session-identity psid
using the verification algorithm V and the respective verification keys
if verification fails, then U i sets acc 
15.for i = 1 to n do in parallel 16. for j = 1 to n, j = i do 17.
U i , on receiving M j |σ j from U j verifies σ j on M j using the verification algorithm V and the verification key pk U j ; 18.
if verification fails, then U i sets acc
= NULL and aborts; 19.
else U i extracts d j from M j and sets psid
end for 25.
= NULL and aborts; 27.
else U i computes the session key sk , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, have a common session key and also a common seed x ∈ Z * q resulting from this execution of AuthKeyAgree. Let the set of users U [n + 1, . . . , n + m] with secret keys x[n + 1, . . . , n + m] want to join the group U [1, . . . , n]. The new instances involved in the procedure Join are Π
We consider a ring of l = m + 3 users
with V 2 now using the seed x as it's private key. We set y 1 = x 1 , y 2 = x, y 3 = x n , y i = x n+i−3 and
The left and right neighbors of V i are respectively V i−1 and V i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l with V 0 = V l and V l+1 = V 1 . We take V l+i to be V i and V 2 is the representative of the set of users U [2, . . . , n − 1]. We invoke KeyAgree (for unauthenticated version of join algorithm) or AuthKeyAgree (for authenticated version of join algorithm) for l users V [1, . . . , l] with respective keys y[1, . . . , l]. For simplicity, we describe the unauthenticated version of the precedure Join and mention the additional modifications required for it's authenticated version.
Let ) and storesK L i ,K R i that can be used for subsequent dynamic operations. Although active participations of the users U [3, . . . , n − 1] are not required during the protocol execution, these users should be able to compute the common session key, the seed, the left key and the right key. Fortunately, these users have x,X 1 = g y 1 andX 3 = g y 3 . So each can compute and store U 2 's left keyK L 2 = g y 1 x , right keyK R 2 = g y 3 x and proceeding in the same way as V 2 does, recover right keys of l users V [1, . . . , l], computes the session key and the common seed. The joining algorithm Join is fomally described below.
We consider a ring of l users V [1, . . . , l] with respective instance numbersd [1, . . . , l] and secret keys y[1, . . . , l]; 3. call KeyAgree (V [1, . . . , l], y[1, . . . , l] 
If we invoke procedure AuthKeyAgree instead of KeyAgree in line 3 of the above algorithm, then messages transmitted during the protocol execution are properly structured with signatures appended to them generated and verified according to the algorithm AuthKeyAgree. At the end of the session, if the protocol terminates normally without abort, then each user V i , 1 ≤ i ≤ l additionally has a common session identity sidd d 1 ) , . . . , (V l ,d l )} apart from the common session key, the seed, the left and the right keys. Users U [3, . . . , n − 1] are also able to compute this session identity from the messages received by them during the protocol execution.
Leave
Suppose U [1, . . . , n] is a set of users with respective secret keys x[1, . . . , n] and an execution of AuthKeyAgree among the instances Π 
where U l i −L and U l i +R are respectively the left and right neighbours of the leaving user 
We consider a ring of n − m users V [1, . . . , n − m]. For a leaving user U l i , it's left neighbor U l i −L and right neighbor U l i +R respectively choose new secret keys x j 1 , x j 2 ∈ Z * q where
Note that in the ring, the left and right neighbors of U j 1 are respectively U j 1 −1 and U j 2 and that of U j 2 are respectively U j 1 and U j 2 +1 . U j 1 sends X j 1 (properly structured with corresponding signature as in AuthKeyAgree) to it's neighbors U j 1 −1 , U j 2 and U j 2 sends X j 2 (properly structured) to it's neighbors U j 1 , U j 2 +1 . This is the first round. In the second round, each user V i , after proper verification of the received messages, computes Let K L i , K R i be respectively the left and right keys of user U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, computed and stored in a previous session among instances Π
U j 1 , U j 2 respectively choose randomly new secret keys x j 1 , x j 2 ∈ Z * q and computes
U j 2 sends M j 2 |σ j 2 to U j 1 and U j 2 +1 (U n+1 = U 1 ); 6. end for (Round 2): 7. for i = 1 to m do in parallel 8.
Let
We set W = {j 1 − 1, j 1 , j 2 , j 2 + 1}; 10. U j 1 −1 , U j 2 , on receiving M j 1 |σ j 1 from U j 1 , verifies σ j 1 on M j 1 using the verification key pk U j 1 ; 11. U j 1 , U j 2 +1 , on receiving M j 2 |σ j 2 from U j 2 , verifies σ j 2 on M j 2 using the verification key pk U j 2 ; 12. if any of these verifications fail, then U w , w ∈ W , sets acc U j 1 −1 modifies its right key K R j 1 −1 = X 
25.for i = 1 to n − m do in parallel 26. for j = 1 to n − m, j = i do 27.
V i , on receiving M j |σ j from V j verifies σ j on M j using the verification algorithm V and the verification key pk V j ; 28.
if verification fails, then V i sets acc
= NULL and aborts; 29.
else V i extracts d j from M j and sets psid
= NULL and aborts; 37.
else V i computes the session key sk 
Security of the Unauthenticated Protocol
We will show that our unauthenticated protocol UP is secure against passive adversary under DDH assumption. We state the security result of UP in Theorem 4.1. The proof, although not exactly same, is quite similar to Katz-Yung [25] proof of security against passive adversary of the unauthenticated BD [18] protocol under DDH assumption.
Theorem 4.1 The unauthenticated protocol UP described in Section 3.1 is secure against passive adversary under DDH assumption, achieves forward secrecy and satisfies the following:
where t = t + O(|P| q E t exp ), t exp is the time required to perform exponentiation in G and q E is the number of Execute query that an adversary may ask.
Proof : Let A be an adversary for the unauthenticated protocol UP. Using this, we can construct an algorithm D which solves the DDH problem with non-negligible advantage. We first consider that the adversary A makes a single Execute query. The number of parties n (≥ 3) among which the adversary A asks Execute query is chosen by A itself. Moreover, since we do not use any long term secret key in our protocol UP, Corrupt query may simply be ignored for A and the protocol trivially achieves forward secrecy. The adversary A has access to three oracles: Execute, Reveal and Test. To deal with the Execute and Reveal query, we define distributions Real and Fake for transcript, session key pair (T, sk) as follows where Real is the real execution scenario of the protocol UP and prove the Claim 1 stated below.
We construct a distinguisher D for DDH problem using A, which on an input (A, B, C) ∈ G 3 , first generates a pair (T, sk) according to the distribution Dist described below (which depends on A, B, C), then runs A on (T, sk) and outputs whatever A outputs.
The distribution Real and the distribution {a, b ←− Z * q , A = g a , B = g b , C = g ab ; (T, sk) ←− Dist : (T, sk)} are statistically equivalent as long as the exponents x j used in Dist are random. On the other hand, the distribution Fake and the distribution {a, b ←− Z * q , c ←− Z * q \ {ab}, A = g a , B = g b , C = g c ; (T, sk) ←− Dist : (T, sk)} are statistically equivalent but for a factor of 1 |G| . In distribution Fake , the value of K R n (= K L 1 ) is chosen uniformly at random from G whereas in Dist , this value is chosen uniformly from G \ {g ab }. These two dristributions are statistically equivalent by the self reducibility property of DDH problem.
|G| as the time of D is dominated by the time t of A.
(of Claim 1)
Next we define the final distribution Fake as follows and prove the Claim 2 stated below:
Claim 2: For any algorithm A running in time t, we have |Prob[(T, sk) ←− Fake :
Given an adversary, we construct an algorithm D that takes (A, B, C) ∈ G 3 as input, generates a pair (T, sk) according to the distribution Dist described below (which depends on A, B, C), runs A on (T, sk) and outputs whatever A outputs.
The distribution Fake and the distribution {a, b ←− Z * q , A = g a , B = g b , C = g ab ; (T, sk) ←− Dist : (T, sk)} are statistically equivalent as long as the exponents x j used in Dist are random. On the other hand, the distribution Fake and the distribution {a,
) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are chosen uniformly at random from G and in Dist, these value are chosen uniformly from G \ {g ab }. Then by the self reducibility property of DDH problem, we have |Prob[(T, sk) ←− Fake :
|G| as the time of D is dominated by that of A (which is t ).
(of Claim 2)
Now we provide the proof of the following claim which deals with the Test query of A.
Claim 3: For any computationally-unbounded adversary
Then we have the following system of equations:
n which is linearly independent from the above system of equations. This implies that the session key sk is independent of the transcript T in Fake. Hence for any computationally unbounded adversary A, Prob[(T, sk 0 ) ←− Fake;
| by Claim 3 and using Claim 1 and Claim 2, we obtain Adv
|G| . Then by applying the self-reducibility property of DDH problem, we get the result stated in the Theorem.
Consider the case for q E (> 1) Execute query. The adversary first generates q E tuples (A i , B i , C i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q E with the following properties from the tuple (A, B, C) ∈ G 3 given to the adversary.
independently of anything else) with all but a probability q E |G| it will be the case that log g C i = log g A i log g B i for all i.
Then proceeding in the similar way as above of defining distributions Real, Fake', Dist', Fake, Dist, we may define distributions Real q E , Fake q E , Dist q E , Fake q E and Dist q E which simply consist of q E independent copies of each of the corresponding distributions. In case of Dist q E and Dist q E , we use the corresponding tuple (A i , B i , C i ) for the i-th copy. We use notation ( T , sk) to denote the transcript/session key pair generated by these distributions. Then similar to the claims 1, 2 and 3, we can prove the following claims:
|G| . where t is as in the statement of the Theorem. 
|G| where t is as in the statement of the Theorem. Note : If n is even, then we need not to define the intermediate (T, sk) distribution Fake . In this case, we can obtain a smaller upper bound of Adv KA UP (1, q E ) considering only the distributions Real and Fake and defining Dist as in the proof of Claim 2. Consequently, we get a more tighter upper bound for Adv KA UP (t, q E ).
Security of the Authenticated (Static) Protocol
We prove that the security of our static authenticated protocol AP (subsection 3.2) relies on that of UP under the assumption that the underlying signature scheme DSig is secure. In fact, given any active adversary attacking AP, we can construct a passive adversary attacking UP of subsection 3.1. We state the security result of AP below in Theorem 4.2. Our proof technique is based on the proof technique used by Katz and Yung [25] . However, there are certain technical differences of our proof from that of [25] .
1. The Katz-Yung technique is a generic technique for converting any unauthenticated protocol into an authenticated protocol. On the other hand, we concentrate on one particular protocol. Hence we can avoid some of the complexities of the Katz-Yung proof.
2. Katz-Yung protocol uses random nonces whereas our protocol does not.
3. In our unauthenticated protocol, there are no long term secret keys. Thus we can avoid the Corrupt oracle queries and can trivially achieve forward secrecy.
Theorem 4.2 The authenticated protocol AP described in section 3.2 is secure against active adversary under DDH assumption, achieves forward secrecy and satisfies the following:
where q E and q S are respectively the maximum number of Execute and Send query an adversary may ask.
Proof : Let A be an adversary which attacks the authenticated protocol AP. Using this we construct an adversary A which attacks the unauthenticated protocol UP. We first have the following claim. 
with X k ∈ G and σ k was not output by any instance of U k on the respective messages. Using A , we construct an algorithm F that forges a signature for DSig as follows: Given a public key pk, algorithm F chooses a random U ∈ P and sets pk U = pk. The other public keys and private keys for the system are generated honestly by F. The forger F simulates all oracle queries of A by executing protocol AP itself, obtaining the necessary signatures with respect to pk U , as needed, from its signing oracle. Thus F provides a perfect simulation for A . If A ever outputs a new valid message/signature pair with respect to pk U = pk, then F outputs this pair as its forgery. The success probability of F is equal to Now we describe the construction of the passive adversary A attacking UP that uses adversary A attacking AP. Adversary A uses a list tlist. It stores pairs of session IDs and transcripts in tlist.
Adversary A generates the verification/signing keys pk U , sk U for each user U ∈ P and gives the verification keys to A . If ever the event Forge occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, A outputs whatever bit is eventually output by A . Note that since the signing and verification keys are generated by A, it can detect occurrence of the event Forge.
A simulates the oracle queries of A using its own queries to the Execute oracle. The idea is that the adversary A queried its Execute oracle to obtain a transcript T of UP for each Execute query of A and also for each initial send query Send 0 (U, i, * ) of A . A then patches appropriate signatures with the messages in T to obtain a transcript T of AP and uses T to answer queries of A . Since by assumption, A can not forge, A is 'limitted' to send messages already contained in T . This technique provides a good simulation. We discuss details below. Execute queries: Suppose A makes a query Execute ((U i 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (U i k , d k ) ). This means that instances Π
} and sends the execute query to its Execute oracle. It receives as output a transcript T of an execution of UP. It appends (S, T ) to tlist. Adversary A then expands the transcript T for the unauthenticated protocol into a transcript T for the authenticated protocol according to the modification described in Section 3.2. It returns T to A . Send queries: The first send query that A makes to an instance is to start a new session. We will denote such queries by Send 0 queries. To start a session between unused instances Π
, the adversary has to make the send queries:
Note that these queries may be made in any order. When all these queries have been made, A sets S = { (U i 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (U i k , d k )} and makes an Execute query to its own execute oracle. It receives a transcript T in return and stores (S, T ) in the list tlist.
Assuming that signatures cannot be forged, any subsequent Send query (i.e., after a Send 0 query) to an instance Π i U is a properly structured message with a valid signature. For any such Send query, A verifies the query according to the algorithm of Section 3.2. If the verification fails, A sets acc i U = 0 and sk i U = NULL and aborts Π i U . Otherwise, A performs the action to be done by Π i U in the authenticated protocol. This is done in the following manner: A first finds the unique entry (S, T ) in tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. Such a unique entry exists for each instance by assumption. Now from T , A finds the appropriate message which corresponds to the message sent by A to Π i U . From the transcript T , adversary A finds the next public information to be output by Π i U and returns it to A . Reveal/Test queries : Suppose A makes the query Reveal(U, i) or Test(U, i) to an instance Π i U for which acc i U = 1. At this point the transcript T in which Π i U participates has already been defined. Now A finds the unique pair (S, T ) in tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. Assuming that the event Forge does not occur, T is the unique unauthenticated transcript which corresponds to the transcript T . Then A makes the appropriate Reveal or Test query to one of the instances involved in T and returns the result to A .
As long as Forge does not occur, the above simulation for A is perfect. Whenever Forge occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. So
The adversary A makes an Execute query for each Execute query of A . Also A makes an Execute query for each session started by A using Send queries. Since a session involves at least two instances, such an Execute query is made after at least two Send queries of A . The total number of such Execute queries is at most q S /2, where q S is the number of Send queries made by A . The total number of Execute queries made by A is at most q E + q S /2, where q E is the number of Execute queries made by A . Also since Adv A,UP ≤ Adv KA UP (t , q E + q S /2) by assumption, we obtain:
This yields the statement of the theorem.
Security of the Dynamic Authenticated Protocol
In this subsection, we will show that the modifications described in Section 3.3 converts the protocol UP of Section 3.1 into a dynamic authenticated key agreement protocol DAP. Assuming that the signature scheme DSig is secure, we can convert any adversary attacking the protocol DAP into an adversary attacking the protocol UP. We ignore Corrupt queries since our protocol DAP does not use any long-term secret keys. Thus the protocol DAP trivially achieves forward secrecy. We state below our security result in Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3
The dynamic authenticated key agreement protocol DAP described in Section 3.3 satifies the following:
where t ≤ t + (|P|q E + q J + q L + q S )t DAP , where t DAP is the time required for execution of DAP by any one of the users.
Proof : Let A be an adversary which attacks the dynamic authenticated protocol DAP. Using this we construct an adversary A which attacks the unauthenticated protocol UP. As in the previous proof, we have the following claim. Claim : Let Forge be the event that a signature is forged by A . Then Prob[Forge] ≤ |P| Adv DSig (t ). Now we describe the construction of the passive adversary A attacking UP that uses adversary A attacking DAP. Adversary A can execute the unauthenticated protocol UP several times among any subset of P and also can obtain the session key of the protocol execution by making Reveal queries to any instances involved in the session. We will show that A itself simulates the Join and Leave queries of A using its own Execute and Reveal oracle. Adversary A maintains a list Tlist to store pairs of session IDs and transcripts. It also uses two lists Jlist and Llist to be specified later.
Adversary A generates the verification/signing keys pk U , sk U for each user U ∈ P and gives the verification keys to A . If ever the event Forge occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, A outputs whatever bit is eventually output by A . Note that since the signing and verification keys are generated by A, it can detect occurrence of the event Forge. A simulates the oracle queries of A using its own queries to the Execute and Reveal oracles. We provide details below. Execute queries: These queries are simulated as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Send queries: Apart from the usual send queries, there are two special type of send queries, Send J and Send L .
If the set
These queries initiate Join(S, S 1 ) query . Note that the instances in S might have already executed either the unauthenticated (a) key agreement protocol or (b) join protocol or (c) leave protocol. Accordingly, A first finds any one of the following form of a unique entry: (1) (S, T ) in Tlist or (2) (S , S , T ) in Jlist with S = S ∪ S or (3) (S , S , T ) in Llist with S = S \ S . If no such entry, A makes an execute query to its own execute oracle on S, gets a transcript T and stores (S, T ) in Tlist.
In case (S, T ) ∈ Tlist, A first makes a Reveal query to any instance in S to obtain the session key sk corresponding to T , computes the seed x = H(sk) and simulates the algorithm for Join by querying its Execute oracle (making appropriate changes). Then patching up signature in each message, A obtains a transcript T and stores (S, S 1 , T ) in Jlist. A thus simulates the transcript T of Join using its own Execute and Reveal oracles. In the remaining cases (2) and (3), T is generated by A itself and so A can simulate transcript T of Join from T .
Similarly, when a set
These queries initiate Leave(S, S 2 ) query. As mentioned above in case of member join, A first finds a unique entry of the form (S, T ) in Tlist or a unique entry of the form (S , S , T ) in Jlist with S = S ∪ S or a unique entry of the form (S , S , T ) in Llist with S = S \ S . If no such entry, then A makes a query to its own execute oracle on S, gets a transcript T and stores (S, T ) in Tlist.
A then simulates the algorithm for Leave by itself and gets a modified transcript T from T as follows: A first detects the positions in T where the new messages are to be injected or the old messages are to be replaced by new messages. A do these modifications in T according to the algorithm Leave described in Section 3.3.1 and gets a modified transcript T by patching up appropriate signature with each message. Thus A expands T into a transcript T for Leave algorithm. A stores (S, S 2 , T ) in Llist. Suppose A makes a Send query to instance Π i U . After proper verification, A finds a unique entry (S, T ) in Tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. The answer to this query is as in Theorem 4.2. If no such entry is found, then A finds a unique entry (S, S 1 , T ) in Jlist such that (U, i) ∈ S 1 . This means that the session for Join has already been initiated. A then obtains the next public information for T to be output by Π i U (provided all necessary information has been received by Π i U by send queries from A ) and sends it to A . If A finds a unique entry (S, S 2 , T ) in Llist such that (U, i) ∈ S 2 , then as above, the appropriate answer to the query is found from T . Join queries : Suppose A makes a query Join(S, S 1 ) where S = { (U i 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (U i k , d k )} and S 1 = { (U i k+1 , d k+1 ) , . . . , (U i k+l , d k+l ) . The instances Π where U l j ∈ {U i 1 , . . . , U i k } for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. A finds an entry of the form (S, S 2 , T ) in Llist. If no such entry, then the adversary A is given no output. Otherwise, A returns T to A . Reveal/Test queries : Suppose A makes the query Reveal(U, i) or Test(U, i) for an instance Π i U for which acc i U = 1. At this point the transcript T in which Π i U participates has already been defined. If T corresponds to the transcript of the authenticated protocol, then A finds the unique pair (S, T ) in Tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. Assuming that the event Forge does not occur, T is the unique unauthenticated transcript which corresponds to the transcript T . Then A makes the appropriate Reveal or Test query to one of the instances involved in T and returns the result to A . Otherwise, T is the transcript for Join or Leave, as the case may be. Since T has been simulated by A, A is able to compute the modified session key and hence send an appropriate reply to A .
As long as Forge does not occur, the above simulation for A is perfect. Whenever Forge occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. So Prob A ,AP [Succ|Forge] = The adversary A makes an Execute query for each Execute query of A . A makes q J Join queries and q L Leave queries. These queries are initialized respectively by Send J and Send L queries of A . Now each of Send J and Send L query of A makes at most one Execute query of A. Thus there are at most q J + q L execute query made by A to respond all the Send J and Send L queries of A .
Also A makes an Execute query for each session started by A using Send queries. Since a session involves at least two instances, such an Execute query is made after at least two Send queries of A . Thus there are (q S − q J − q L )/2 execute queries of A to respond all other Send queries of A , where q S is the number of Send queries made by A . Hence the total number of Execute queries made by A is at most q E + q J + q L + (q S − q J − q L )/2 = q E + (q J + q L + q S )/2, where q E is the number of Execute queries made by A . Also since Adv A,UP (t, q E , q J , q L , q S ) ≤ Adv KA UP (t , q E + q J /2 + q L /2 + q S /2) by assumption, we obtain: Adv AKA DAP ≤ Adv KA UP (t , q E + (q J + q L + q S )/2) + Prob [Forge] . This yields the statement of the theorem.
Conclusion
We present and analyze a simple and elegant constant round group key agreement protocol and enhance it to dynamic setting where a set of users can leave or join the group at any time during protocol execution with updated keys. The emphasis of this work is to achieve provable security of our scheme under DDH assumption. We provide a concrete security analysis of our protocol against active adversary in the standard security model of Bresson et al. [15] adapting Katz-Yung [25] technique. The protocol is forward secure, efficient and fully symmetric.
